Soren Kierkegaard purports three separate ways of living: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religous. In class we were given "the lover's example" to better illustrate the differences between these ways of living, and the characteristics/responses to a situation associated with each given way of living. The Lover's Example reads: "a man loves a woman but they cannot be together". The religious person's response to this situation is to NOT give up on love, despite all odds; he would have faith that he and the woman could be together in this world, in this time.
...
Jean-Paul Satre defines living in "Bad Faith" as living life while disregarding either facticity (practical limitations, situational obstacles) or transcendence (your ability as subject to will outcomes into actuality, choose your own course).
Satre might potentially argue that the lover from the example living religiously (believing in the viability of his true love against all odds) is living in Bad Faith because he fails to aknowledge the facticity, the real-life, situational boundaries.
For me, the philosophers' conflict of opinion regarding this specific instance raises some questions:
1) Is 'love' actually an exception to facticity?
2)If you choose to believe unconsitionally in the romantic idea of love, are you exempt from being labled as living in Satre's Bad Faith?
3)Are there 'practical limitations' on love?
Showing posts with label Maddy Fox. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maddy Fox. Show all posts
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Class Synopsis Friday April 1
We spent the first part of class reviewing and wrapping up Soren Kierkegaard’s ideas. A quiz was given which was made up of ten questions that involved several key tenants of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, including but not limited to the following concepts:
Kierkegaard suggested there are three stages on life’s way: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The aesthetic is associated with a lack of identity—or commitment or seriousness directed toward any one identity—a detachment, a tendency to live in the immediate, an avoidance of taking responsibility or making judgments, and a conception of daily life as a game, a show, a rat race, etc. The ethical involves putting the universal before the particular for a greater end; a person might act in accordance with the laws or demands of the majority for a greater good or duty (their actions can be seen as unfortunate but necessary, eliciting pity). The religious deals with going ‘beyond’ the universal so as to only fulfill the duty one has to oneself and the duty one has to the Absolute; these two duties must always one and the same (e.g.: God’s will was for Abraham to prove Abraham’s faith and Abraham’s will was for Abraham to prove Abraham’s faith). Emotions associated with movement from one way of life to another are fear, avoidance, despair, or anxiety, because this movement is a break or a leap and is often uncertain and uncomfortable or daunting. Kierkegaard uses Agamemnon and Brutus as examples of what it means to be a tragic hero: each of these men’s actions are universalizable and understandable; the men resigned to their ethical duties and therefore their actions evoke pity. Abraham and the Virgin Mary are examples of the Knight of Faith as their actions cannot be understood universally or justified in the ethical realm. Their actions are completely particular and specific to the individual, and they cannot be understood under the greater umbrella of social or ethical norms, expectations, or requirements. Abraham did not act to save a nation, uphold the idea of the state, or appease angry gods for the greater good of his community, rather he acted on a one-to-one relationship to God; therefore, in the ethical, Abraham must be called a murderer because in the ethical the father is required to love and protect the son.
At this point in class the question was posed: “Are great people throughout history great because we can understand them (they are the most ethical) or because they are more (they are unpredictable, revolutionary)?” We considered Martin Luther King Jr. noting that we could in fact understand him better if he became violent; we would be able to relate and universalize his actions, it would make more sense. MLK’s non-violence was revolutionary, absurd, ‘beyond’.
We continued to explore some of Kierkegaard’s ideas. For Kierkegaard, truth is a paradox, an enigma, subjectivity, untruth, internal; the only thing we can know for sure is the Socratic recognition that we know nothing. Because truth forms identity, each person’s truth is unique, absurd, and his or her own.
The next concept we discussed is best expressed as a question: “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?”—which can be paralleled with this concept that (in Aristotle’s three-part construction of the soul: Vegetative, Appetive, and Rational) the wants and needs associated with the Vegetative and Appetive components—necessities such as shelter, water, food, nourishment, and ends or needs involving desire or willing, respectively—must be suspended to achieve the ultimate end, the rational. Similarly, one must suspend the teleology of the ethical to be in the religious way of life. Religion is the teleological suspension of the ethical, but only if the religious trumps the ethical. Take, for example, the story of Abraham when considering the suspension of the teleology of the ethical. Abraham’s act is not a means to an end, rather it is an end in itself; it is for no purpose but for fulfilling his own identity: answering to both himself and the Absolute with the same action, which he ‘must’ perform. As stated previously, Abraham’s will and God’s will are identical, which proves God’s role as the Absolute in this story. The Absolute has to be completely internalized by the actor, to the point that there is no longer a subject/object distinction; there is no separation or distinction between intention and action.
Chris sought further clarification on this subject and wondered if there can be an Absolut e in the religious other than God; and he looked for an alternative solution. He asked if a nationalist could act with his or her country as the Absolute. At this point, a discussion ensued centering on the nationalist as a religious person. It was determined that the will of a nation cannot perfectly match the will of a person, and that the teleology involved with nationalism largely disqualifies it from the realm of the religious. We then questioned “What about Hitler?” Can Hitler be considered a religious man because his fanaticism and devotion to his cause, though evil, completely defines him as a person, arguably fulfilling his identity? What is the Absolute in this situation? It was determined that Kierkegaard would not consider Hitler religious.
After wrapping up Kierkegaard, we began to talk about Friedrich Nietzsche, a German philosopher and philologist who lived from 1844 to 1900. We learned that a philologist is one who studies classical languages and classical history. Nietzsche was a rising star in the field of philology until his book, “Birth of Tragedy,” which was considered unscholarly because of its mention of the mythical characters Apollo and Dionysus; the publication of this book marked his transformation to philosophy. We began our discussion on Nietzsche by talking about our existing ideas and conceptions of Nietzsche. Our main idea was that Nietzsche was a Nihilist, which we learned is a common perception and a perverse misunderstanding. It is true that Nietzsche talks about Nihilism ad nosium (over and over), but he is actually an anti-Nihilist; Nihilism is Nietzsche’s central target of critique. Nietzsche’s predicted the ailment of Nihilism.
We began to discuss Nietzsche’s idea of the Ubermensch, or ‘over-man,’ which is a life-affirming creator. We discussed how the Third Reich misinterpreted and misapplied Nietzsche’s Ubermensch to justify their actions. (Somebody pointed out how this misuse of Nietzsche’s work proves Kierkegaard’s assertion that the author is separate from the work that he or she produces.)
Nietzsche “transformed many ideas and values that form the background of our Western culture…[and] questioned the traditional concepts of reason, nature, God, time, and religion”. He brought about an end of metaphysics because he questions truth and suggests truth is a construct.
At the end of class we began talking about Nietzsche’s history: the problem of modernity and his three forms of history. We talked about how a healthy culture is one that has horizons that its people live within and unconditional beliefs---an identity—which give life and meaning to the culture and allow it to be strong and productive. An example was given of Dr. Layne living in Belgium, being open to learning about Belgium and welcome new ideas, but at the same time still maintaining her Americanism as her true cultural identity. On the other hand, we talked about how a diseased nation is one that engages in a fight to prove its identity; a struggle to prove identity proves decay.
Kierkegaard suggested there are three stages on life’s way: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The aesthetic is associated with a lack of identity—or commitment or seriousness directed toward any one identity—a detachment, a tendency to live in the immediate, an avoidance of taking responsibility or making judgments, and a conception of daily life as a game, a show, a rat race, etc. The ethical involves putting the universal before the particular for a greater end; a person might act in accordance with the laws or demands of the majority for a greater good or duty (their actions can be seen as unfortunate but necessary, eliciting pity). The religious deals with going ‘beyond’ the universal so as to only fulfill the duty one has to oneself and the duty one has to the Absolute; these two duties must always one and the same (e.g.: God’s will was for Abraham to prove Abraham’s faith and Abraham’s will was for Abraham to prove Abraham’s faith). Emotions associated with movement from one way of life to another are fear, avoidance, despair, or anxiety, because this movement is a break or a leap and is often uncertain and uncomfortable or daunting. Kierkegaard uses Agamemnon and Brutus as examples of what it means to be a tragic hero: each of these men’s actions are universalizable and understandable; the men resigned to their ethical duties and therefore their actions evoke pity. Abraham and the Virgin Mary are examples of the Knight of Faith as their actions cannot be understood universally or justified in the ethical realm. Their actions are completely particular and specific to the individual, and they cannot be understood under the greater umbrella of social or ethical norms, expectations, or requirements. Abraham did not act to save a nation, uphold the idea of the state, or appease angry gods for the greater good of his community, rather he acted on a one-to-one relationship to God; therefore, in the ethical, Abraham must be called a murderer because in the ethical the father is required to love and protect the son.
At this point in class the question was posed: “Are great people throughout history great because we can understand them (they are the most ethical) or because they are more (they are unpredictable, revolutionary)?” We considered Martin Luther King Jr. noting that we could in fact understand him better if he became violent; we would be able to relate and universalize his actions, it would make more sense. MLK’s non-violence was revolutionary, absurd, ‘beyond’.
We continued to explore some of Kierkegaard’s ideas. For Kierkegaard, truth is a paradox, an enigma, subjectivity, untruth, internal; the only thing we can know for sure is the Socratic recognition that we know nothing. Because truth forms identity, each person’s truth is unique, absurd, and his or her own.
The next concept we discussed is best expressed as a question: “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?”—which can be paralleled with this concept that (in Aristotle’s three-part construction of the soul: Vegetative, Appetive, and Rational) the wants and needs associated with the Vegetative and Appetive components—necessities such as shelter, water, food, nourishment, and ends or needs involving desire or willing, respectively—must be suspended to achieve the ultimate end, the rational. Similarly, one must suspend the teleology of the ethical to be in the religious way of life. Religion is the teleological suspension of the ethical, but only if the religious trumps the ethical. Take, for example, the story of Abraham when considering the suspension of the teleology of the ethical. Abraham’s act is not a means to an end, rather it is an end in itself; it is for no purpose but for fulfilling his own identity: answering to both himself and the Absolute with the same action, which he ‘must’ perform. As stated previously, Abraham’s will and God’s will are identical, which proves God’s role as the Absolute in this story. The Absolute has to be completely internalized by the actor, to the point that there is no longer a subject/object distinction; there is no separation or distinction between intention and action.
Chris sought further clarification on this subject and wondered if there can be an Absolut e in the religious other than God; and he looked for an alternative solution. He asked if a nationalist could act with his or her country as the Absolute. At this point, a discussion ensued centering on the nationalist as a religious person. It was determined that the will of a nation cannot perfectly match the will of a person, and that the teleology involved with nationalism largely disqualifies it from the realm of the religious. We then questioned “What about Hitler?” Can Hitler be considered a religious man because his fanaticism and devotion to his cause, though evil, completely defines him as a person, arguably fulfilling his identity? What is the Absolute in this situation? It was determined that Kierkegaard would not consider Hitler religious.
After wrapping up Kierkegaard, we began to talk about Friedrich Nietzsche, a German philosopher and philologist who lived from 1844 to 1900. We learned that a philologist is one who studies classical languages and classical history. Nietzsche was a rising star in the field of philology until his book, “Birth of Tragedy,” which was considered unscholarly because of its mention of the mythical characters Apollo and Dionysus; the publication of this book marked his transformation to philosophy. We began our discussion on Nietzsche by talking about our existing ideas and conceptions of Nietzsche. Our main idea was that Nietzsche was a Nihilist, which we learned is a common perception and a perverse misunderstanding. It is true that Nietzsche talks about Nihilism ad nosium (over and over), but he is actually an anti-Nihilist; Nihilism is Nietzsche’s central target of critique. Nietzsche’s predicted the ailment of Nihilism.
We began to discuss Nietzsche’s idea of the Ubermensch, or ‘over-man,’ which is a life-affirming creator. We discussed how the Third Reich misinterpreted and misapplied Nietzsche’s Ubermensch to justify their actions. (Somebody pointed out how this misuse of Nietzsche’s work proves Kierkegaard’s assertion that the author is separate from the work that he or she produces.)
Nietzsche “transformed many ideas and values that form the background of our Western culture…[and] questioned the traditional concepts of reason, nature, God, time, and religion”. He brought about an end of metaphysics because he questions truth and suggests truth is a construct.
At the end of class we began talking about Nietzsche’s history: the problem of modernity and his three forms of history. We talked about how a healthy culture is one that has horizons that its people live within and unconditional beliefs---an identity—which give life and meaning to the culture and allow it to be strong and productive. An example was given of Dr. Layne living in Belgium, being open to learning about Belgium and welcome new ideas, but at the same time still maintaining her Americanism as her true cultural identity. On the other hand, we talked about how a diseased nation is one that engages in a fight to prove its identity; a struggle to prove identity proves decay.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Epicurean Carpe Diem
For me personally, the lecture on the Epicureans brought new meaning to the trite phrase "live each moment to the fullest," or any such phrase to that effect. After hearing those words over and over again for years and years, the phrase had become devoid of almost any significance, however the lecture has restored any meaning that had perhaps been lost through repition. Personally I find the construction of the reality of the world around us as simply a series of moments which are individually infinite extremely interesting. If you live according to the message that 'the only moment that is is right now'-and you focus on the quality of pleasure in any one singular moment versus the quantity of pleasure over however many other moments-you can be a much happier person. This view of the world allows one to let go of any feelings of guilt, regret, or shame for past mistakes as well as any fear, uncertainty, or anxiety associated with the future. I also like the idea that in any one moment, we can be infinite and our happiness can be infinite. This particular idea reminds me of one of the most striking lines from The Perks of Being a Wallflower, a novel written by Stephen Chbosky, which reads: "And in that moment, I swear we were infinite." For me, this simple line evokes such strong emotion; it elicits the feeling of the most true, limitless happiness. I believe the essence of the Epicurean Carpe Diem is just to allow yourself to be as happy as you can in any given moment by limiting pain, not taking a single moment for granted, never postponing pleasure or happiness, and making sure to recognize the pleasure of simply existing in the only moment, the current moment.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Aristotle's Conception of the Soul
Aristotle's conception of the body/soul connection is fascinating. I tend to believe that the soul and the body are separate entities; however I haven't really ever considered that we could each be one living organism, and our souls and bodies could be one and the same. The distinction between the Appetive and the Desire of the non-rational soul is interesting because I have never associated physical or biological needs as a function of the soul. It is interesting, however, to think that the Appetive doesn't respond to rational thought, but one can reason away desires. So far, I don't believe myself to have a very philosophically-oreiented mind--the lack of answers in the field of philosophy is daunting to me--but this conception of the soul is the first thing that I can relate to and that makes a significant amount of sense.
Sunday, February 6, 2011
You're Unable to Be Good if You Can't Define 'Good'?
We discussed earlier in the course how the field of philosophy--and the definition of philosophy--is a philosophical question in and of itself. Since philosophical questions have no concrete, definite answers, can it be assumed that philosophy, as a philosophical question, has no one concrete definition? If we cannot define philosophy, how can we know what philosophy is? How can we be philosophers? Socrates' criteria for the Good, and his requirement that practice and definition must coincide, is difficult for me to understand and accept. There are many examples such as the one above that would complicate this concept. Can one not understand simply through experience versus articulation? What of uneducated people, who lack the vocabulary to adequately express and ennumerate the subject which is at hand? Can it be said that they don't have any grasp on the Good; they aren't 'good' people; they aren't virtuous?
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Radical Flux
After considering the pre-Socratic philosophers whose main points we reviewed in class this past week, I believe the philosopher who intrigues me the most is Heraclitus. I am attracted to the fact that he is a metaphysical and epistemological optimist; to me it is comforting to believe in a definable arche and I think I generally subscribe to the idea that the natural world is knowable, intelligible, and accessible. Heraclitus's idea of fire as arche is especially significant. While today with modern science we know of the basic molecular structure and atomic make-up as applied to the world around us, I think the idea Heraclitus touched on is extremely important. Radical flux-the recognition of the inability to pin anything down and the concept that the world is in a constant state of change-is a critical component of life and is absolutely undeniable. I think it is perhaps the most important aspect of living, or 'becoming' as Heroclitus would say, and is essential to embrace if you intend to discover Truth. To attempt to control your surroundings is naive and to believe that you can is ignorant. I think it is interesting to be able to understand and define life by consciously letting go of any hope of a concrete understanding or definition, and accept the fact that everything is constantly in flux.
Monday, January 24, 2011
Philosophy as a Discipline versus a Lifestyle
One idea brought up on Friday which, for me, was extremely thought provoking was the conception of philosophy as a lifestyle versus a discipline. This question, especially when considered with the assertion that coherence is a criteria for truth, and therefore the truths one holds must be consistent to be recognized as true, seems to me to lend philosophy a role as strictly a discipline versus a lifestyle. How can one truly be consistent in their role as "philosopher" each and every minute of every day? To maintain one's role as philosopher one must be constantly concerned with presenting valid arguments based on sound premises (ie, never abusing an opponent, never simply contradicting, never simply stating a preference or a belief without appealing to facts or citing evidence.) This seems nearly impossible to perform on a day-to-day, minute-to-minute basis; the idea that one never sheds the skin of "philosopher" seems sort of absurd. If one considers oneself a true philospher, can one ever legitimately seperate from this role and appeal strictly to belief or opinion, etc? To me it seems that to truly practice philosophy, one must devote special attention to the action of this special type of thought. In my social psychology class I've learned that there are two types of cognition: automatic and effortful. I assert that thinking in a philosophical way falls under "effortful," and that it is impractical to believe one engages in effortful thinking every second of every day. In my mind, this seems to place philosophy is the "discipline" category versus the "lifestyle" category, because to me "lifestyle" implies the role of "philosopher" is never shed. I believe philosophical thought can be turned on and off, even by the practiced, trained, educated philosopher, and therefore philosophy is a discipline. It must be considered, though, that the assertion I am presenting is based strictly on my own construct of what "discipline" and "lifestyle" mean.
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